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Private Copyright: Digital Rights Management Systems and 
the Consumer 
 





Before the Internet, transactions for copyrighted works were not treated much differently 
from transactions for other forms of property.1 Any limitations upon the use of a 
copyrighted work were generally known to consumers and in place via copyright law.2
Initial attempts by content holders to extend control of their work beyond the scope of 
copyright law were struck down by courts.3
The emergence of the digital age has radically changed the nature of consumer 
transactions for copyrighted goods. Copyrighted works in digital form (digital content) 
can be replicated and distributed on an enormous scale through use of personal computers 
and the Internet.4 With potentially millions of infringers, traditional copyright law has 
 
1 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a Federal 
Common Law of Contract, 35 Rutgers L. J. 959, 959-960.
2 Consumers recognized themselves as the owner of the physical embodiment of the copyrighted 
work, but knew that Copyright law limited their ownership in various ways. See Id.  
3 The earliest and most famous of these attempts concerned the first sale doctrine. See Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (U.S. Supreme Court ruling that Copyright law did not permit a 
content owner to control second-hand sales of a copyrighted work); see also Quality King Distributors Inc., 
v. L’anza Research International Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (where the Court found that a content holder 
could not prevent the distribution of “grey market” goods through Copyright law). The first-sale doctrine is 
now codified in U.S. law at 17 U.S.C. § 109. Commonplace business enterprises such as video rental stores 
have used §109 to flourish by not being required to gain the content-holder’s permission for their activities.   
4 See Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems: Current and Future 
Issues on Secondary Liability Under Copyright Laws in the United States and Japan, 22 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. 
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been ill-equipped to enforce a content holder’s rights.5 Content holders6 – with the 
support of Congress – have responded by employing Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
systems to protect digital content. This entails the use of a license agreement to which the 
consumer must consent, technological protections designed to stop or curb infringement 
of the digital work, and the support of legislation that makes it illegal to circumvent these 
technological protections.7 DRM has had the effect of what many commentators have 
termed the “privatization of copyright.”8
The result has been a market paradigm plush with legal issues regarding contracts, 
antitrust, privacy, free speech, and copyright fair use. This article does not pretend that it 
can cover each of these issues in detail. Rather, it seeks to examine these issues with 
respect to how this market paradigm affects the consumer and what changes can be made 
to bring about a more sensible digital content market in the United States.  
 This article is presented in four parts. Part I outlines the relevant provisions of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and provides background information on DRM systems. Part II 
discusses how the use of DRM systems has impacted consumer digital content 
 
Rev. 37, 38 (2001); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and 
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002). 
5 See Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 910 (2002).
6 Throughout this paper I use the term “content holder” to refer to any person or entity that holds 
legal copyright title to music, video, software, or anything else capable of being protected by Digital Rights 
Management systems.  
7 See generally Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 
Am. J. Comp. L. 323.
8 See id. at note 161; Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American 
Copyright Law, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 173; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial 
Exchange, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1570, 1613 (1995); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace – Rights 
Without Laws?, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1155, 1164-1165 (1998). 
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transactions. Part III proposes steps that can be taken to make aspects of this market more 
fair and transparent. Concluding thoughts are discussed in Part IV.  
 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE DIGITAL CONTENT MARKETPLACE  
 
A transaction for DRM-protected digital content involves several parties –  the 
consumer, the content holder, and consumer device manufacturers – and possibly 
conflicting legal frameworks – federal copyright law and the contract law of the state in 
which the transaction took place. This section will provide an overview of how these 
different entities and legal areas interact to shape the digital content marketplace.  
 
A.   The Copyright Act 
 
Copyright law is a balancing act between providing incentives for authors to create 
original works and the “general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors.”9 The Copyright Act of 197610 (the Copyright Act) enumerates the rights of 
copyright holders and codifies defenses to copyright infringement. It has been amended 
several times since its enactment. The most significant of these was the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act11 (DMCA) of 1998, but its provisions will be omitted here so 
it can be introduced in a better context.  
 
9 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948), quoting Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal et. al., 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
10 17 U.S.C. 101-810.
11 Pub. L. 105-304.
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1. The Bundle of Rights Granted to the Content Holder  
 
To provide incentives to authors to generate original works, the Copyright Act grants 
exclusive rights to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression…. which can be reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”12 As this provision implies, digital content is 
protected by the Copyright Act because it is read with the aid of a device. In the case of 
computer programs, copyright protection extends to both the source code and the object 
code.13 
The Copyright Act gives the content holder many exclusive rights, the most 
important of which is the right to exclusively reproduce copies of the work. Other 
important rights are the right to create derivative works and the right to alienate any of 
the exclusive rights granted by copyright. Alienation permits the content holder to license 
the work or derivative works as they see fit.  
 
2. Basic Copyright Exemptions for the Public  
 
12 17 U.S.C. 102. 
13 The source code of a computer program is the human-readable text that the program is written in. 
While source code can still be arcane to a layman, it is understandable by a person versed in the computer 
language. Object code is source code that has been compiled into commands that the computer hardware 
can understand. It consists of strings of 1’s and 0’s and is void of any cognizable human element. For an 
analysis of the copyrightability of source code and object code, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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 The Copyright Act also seeks to ensure that the public can benefit from the creation of 
original works by limiting the monopoly that copyright grants to the author of an original 
work. Three of these limitations are relevant to the discussion in this article: the first sale 
doctrine, the exceptions for computer programs, and fair use.14 
i. The First Sale Doctrine 
 
The first sale doctrine allows the “owner” of a copy of a copyrighted work to sell 
that copy without the permission of the copyright holder.15 This severs a content holder’s 
distribution rights of a particular copy of a copyrighted work once that copy is sold 
downstream. The seminal case in the first sale doctrine occurred before its codification as 
§ 109 of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court ruled in Bobbs-Merrill16 that resale of a 
book could not be prohibited by the copyright holder because there was no privity of 
contract between the copyright holder and the consumer.17 Copyright law by itself did not 
grant the copyright holder any such right to control second sales of the work.18 
14 Qualifying these limitations as “rights” is somewhat of a misnomer. The first sale doctrine and the 
computer program exceptions only apply to the “owner” of a copy of a copyrighted work, not necessarily to 
the general public (e.g., a licensee or non-party). See 17 U.S.C §§ 109, 117. Despite the undisputed 
importance of fair use and the characterization of it as a “right” by many commentators, it is properly 
understood as a defense to copyright infringement. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (the U.S. 
Supreme Court characterizes fair use as a defense).  
15 17 U.S.C. 109.
16 Supra, note 3.  
17 A printed notice in the book that stated second sale restrictions was insufficient to establish 
privity of contract. Id. at 342. 
18 Id. at 350. 
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The first sale doctrine becomes complicated when applied to digital works 
because many digital works involve a license and not a traditional transfer of 
ownership19. There has been legal confusion as to whether a licensee qualifies as an 
owner for purposes of the first sale doctrine. The courts that have construed such licenses 
to constitute ownership in this respect have either cited a disdain for “shrink-wrap” 
licenses,20 suggested the terms of the contract are substantially similar to the rights of an 
owner under federal copyright law,21 or have otherwise hinted that such licenses are 
preempted by federal law.22 Some courts have held otherwise, finding that the first sale 
doctrine is inapplicable in a licensing agreement.23 
ii.  Computer Program Exceptions 
 
19 This is mostly the case in computer software and content downloaded from the Internet. See 
Adobe Systems, Inc. v. One-Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-1092 (N.D.C.A 2000) (citing 
evidence that almost all software manufacturers use a license agreement). 
20 See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., 25 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1229-1231 (C.D. Utah 1997) (where 
the court determined that consumer purchases of plaintiff’s product from the defendant qualified as sales 
under the U.C.C., and cited disdain for the shrink-wrap license of the plaintiff’s product that “modify the 
original purchase agreement with the retailer.”).  
21 See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology and the Software Link, Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 
100 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating that the terms of the license agreement are almost identical so as if the 
transaction were “characterized as a sale of a copy.”). 
22 See id., note 7 (where the court suggests that purpose of computer program license agreements are 
to “avoid the federal copyright law first sale doctrine,” raising questions of federal preemption.); but see 
id., note 27 (stating that the court does not intend to “resolve the sale-license question.”). 
23 See Adobe at 1089-1092 (holding that a license agreement is sufficient to find the first sale 
doctrine inapplicable); Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.Supp.2d. 1164, 1178 (E.D. 
Mo. 2004). 
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 Congress recognized computer software as somewhat unique to the rest of copyright 
because of its functionality. 24 Accordingly, the Copyright Act limits the exclusive rights 
granted to the content holder of a computer program in § 117 by permitting the “owner” 
of a copy of that software to create copies as “an essential step in the utilization of the 
computer program”25 or for “archival purposes.”26 
Similar to the provisions of the first sale doctrine, the computer program 
exceptions grant these exceptions to the “owner” of the copy of the work, leaving it 
unclear as to the rights of software licensees. Raymond Nimmer dissects this dilemma 
best in stating that “[e]ither a licensee can never be the owner of a copy for purposes of § 
117 or ownership of the licensed copy depends on the terms of the license agreement.”27 
Some courts have drawn on the former interpretation and denied ownership rights to 
those without formal title.28 Other courts have found formal title not to be dispositive of § 
 
24 Computer software has both expressible elements (protected by copyright law) and functional 
elements (protected by patent law). In order to use the functional elements of a computer program, a 
computer must “copy” the computer code from its storage on a hard drive (where the program can only be 
read at a comparatively slow pace) to the computer’s random access memory (better known as RAM, 
where the computer can access and run the program at a faster pace). Thus copyright law would punish 
those who merely run a computer program without being licensed to do so (e.g., a computer repair 
technician who was not licensed to “copy” the software by the copyright holder). For the seminal case in 
this dilemma, see MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Final 
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (July 31, 1978) 
(CONTU Report) at 31. 
25 17 U.S.C. 117(1). This is to avoid the undesirable result where using the software would 
constitute copyright infringement because the computer must copy the program from storage into its RAM 
memory in order to utilize the program. See generally MAI, supra note 14. 
26 17 U.S.C. 117(2).
27 Raymond T. Nimmer, Law of Computer Technology: Rights Licenses Liabilities, § 7:69 (3d ed. 
2003). 
28 See MAI, supra note 14, at note 5 (shortly stating that defendant is a licensee and thus cannot 
qualify as an “owner” for purposes under § 117); Advanced Computer Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. 
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 
F.Supp. 337 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (stating that leasing and having possession of software does not qualify one 
as an “owner” under § 117). 
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117 ownership and analyze the license agreement to determine whether the contract 
“exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over [the copy of the program]” where the 
licensee could “be sensibly considered the owner of the copy.”29 
iii.  Fair Use 
 
Fair use – codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act – is a doctrine that provides a defense 
to copyright infringement so as to seek a balance between the competing goals of 
providing incentives for creative innovation and giving the general public use of these 
innovations.30 § 107 provides for a four-factor balancing test that a court should consider 
when analyzing a fair use defense: (i) purpose and character of the use; (ii) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used; (iii) the nature of the copyrighted work; and (iv) 
the effect of the alleged infringement upon work’s potential market or value.31 The 
availability of fair use has been heavily debated with respect to DRM and copyright 
restrictions. However, this article addresses fair use only in the context that it directly 
restrains consumer use of the work: time shifting and space shifting.32 
29 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) (finding § 117 ownership where the 
licensee had a permanent ownership and the software was created specifically for the licensee’s purposes); 
see Telecomm Technical Services Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1325 
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding ownership within the meaning of § 117 because the software license was granted 
forever in return for a single payment); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 8.08[B][1][c]. But see DSC Communs. Corp. v. Pulse Communs., Inc., 710 F.3d 1354, 1360-
1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that not all licensees are “non-owners” for purposes of § 117, but that the 
restrictions in the license agreement there were indicative of finding no ownership). 
30 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984).
31 17 U.S.C. 107. 
 
32 Other heavily-debated fair use issues such as commentary are better addressed in a free speech 
context than in a consumer protection context. 
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 Time shifting entails the recording of television programming onto a device – 
such as a VCR or digital video recorder (DVR) – so as to be viewed at a more convenient 
time. Time shifting was sanctioned as fair use in the landmark Supreme Court case Sony 
Betamax, where the Court determined that Sony’s Betamax video recorder was not liable 
for indirect infringement because it was capable of significant non-infringing uses.33 
Space shifting is a fair use concept permitting the owner of a copy of a work, such 
as a digital music file (e.g., an mp3 file), to convert that copy to another format. It is 
argued as an analogy to time shifting, but has been met with mixed results. Some courts 
have found it to constitute fair use by qualifying it as “paradigmatic noncommercial 
personal use.”34 Others have rejected it, stating that “[c]opyright… is not designed to 
afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the copyrightholders’ 
property interests.”35 
Under the current legal framework time shifting has been determined as fair use, 
but space shifting as fair use has not been as well-established.   
 
B. DRM Systems 
 
33 Sony Betamax, supra note 32. 
34 Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. V. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 
1999);
35 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that space shifting could not be 
construed as fair use when the converted media would be widely available to piracy).  
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 DRM systems are technological safeguards that provide a means for copyright holders to 
control the downstream consumption, access, and control of their digital content.36 DRM 
systems can be simplistic – perhaps just prevent end-user copying – or they can facilitate 
intricate business models.37 The potential regulatory ability of DRM is so profound that 
many commentators have suggested that DRM systems has enabled the “privatization” of 
copyright and the next generation of copyright legislation will aim to forge public access 
to DRM-protected works.38 
This article introduces DRM systems through its four main features: (1) 
technological protections, (2) the DMCA, (3) end-user license agreements (EULAs), and 
(4) consumer technology licenses. 
 
1. DRM Technological Protections 
 
DRM systems will typically use several technologies to protect digital content. The 
intertwining of these technologies helps establish a secure platform for transmitting 
digital content. 
The most important of the technologies used in DRM is probably the encryption 
technologies.39 Encryption technologies effectively hinder the copying of digital content 
 
36 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 52.  
37 Id.  
38 See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering Information Transactions, 53 Vand. 
L. Rev. 2063, 2078 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 125, 130 (1999);  
39 See Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of 
Technology, Law, and Commercial Licenses, 22 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 198, 204 (2000).
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because any copies of that content can only be used if the decryption key is provided.40 
Without the decryption key, the digital content is gibberish. The decryption keys can be 
provided in many ways, but they must not be directly accessible by the user. If a user has 
access to the decryption key, the encryption technology is compromised because the 
content is then freely accessible by the user. The decryption keys are often embedded in 
hardware devices to make access to the keys very difficult. This helps ensure the security 
of the DRM system because hardware is more “tamper-proof” than software. But it is 
important to note that the use of hardware does not make the security of a DRM system 
infallible.41 
DRM systems are not employed just to protect content but to manage content as 
well. “Meta-data” is information embedded as preamble to the digital content or in the 
content itself42 that tells the DRM system who is entitled to use the content and with what 
rights or privileges. This allows the content holder to control in minute detail how the 
digital content is used.43 
DRM systems can take assertive action to protect digital content. A DRM system 
can block access to digital content if it detects or suspects any irregularities. This could 
consist of the discovery of pirated content or devices that have been tampered with to 
 
40 See id.; Bechtold, supra note 6, 326.  
41 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (where at issue was 
the successful circumvention of CSS, the DVD DRM system that was embedded in DVD players).   
42 Embedding meta-data within the digital content is known as “digital watermarking.” It is typically 
more difficult for hackers to circumvent because removing the watermark will degrade the content or 
possibly make the content useless. See Frank Hartung & Martin Kutter, Multimedia Watermarking 
Techniques, 87 Proceedings of the IEEE 1079 (1999). 
43 Bechtold, supra note 6, 326. 
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circumvent the DRM protections.44 More complex DRM systems can monitor a user’s 
activities or file system and communicate this information back to the content holder 
though the Internet.45 It also can automatically update itself so as to keep the consumer 
equipped with the most robust protection system available.  
The difficulty in implementing a DRM system is that the DRM protections must 
be standardized into consumer devices. Each device and component in the DRM system 
must be unable to transmit the content to the consumer in an unencrypted digital form.46 
As an example, the DRM protection system used in DVDs, CSS, must ensure that each 
device capable of decrypting CSS-encrypted content does not transmit that content to a 
consumer in unencrypted digital form. It is acceptable if the device transmit an 
unencrypted analog signal to a consumer.47 However, the purpose of the DRM system 
would be frustrated if the device transmitted a digital signal to a digital television which 
in turn allowed the user access to the unprotected digital content. A robust DRM system 
must ensure that the digital television device does not allow the user access to digital 
content, and the most appropriate way to achieve this is to standardize the way devices 
 
44 Id. at 328. See also Dave Marsh, Output Content Protection and Windows Vista (April 27, 2005), 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/device/stream/output_protect.mspx (Jan. 10, 2007). 
45 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute 
Resolution, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 151, 175 (2000).  
46 See Marks & Turnbull, supra note 42, at 204. Various groups have come together to try and 
balance the needs between the device manufacturers and the content holders to develop standard DRM 
systems. See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 330.  
47 The emission of an analog signal presents a reduced danger of piracy since there is an inherent 
degradation of quality in analog signals. 
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implement the DRM system.  Computing systems are being developed and tested today 
to ensure that digital content can never be transmitted in an unencrypted form.48 
2. The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
 
The private sector by itself is not sufficient to protect digital content. DRM systems are 
all vulnerable to being circumvented by hackers.49 The widespread distribution of 
circumvention technologies can completely compromise a DRM system. To help curb 
this problem, Congress provided content holders with legal tools to reinforce DRM 
protection through the passing the DMCA in 1998.50 
The DMCA has two provisions relevant to DRM. The first provision makes it 
illegal to personally circumvent or traffic in tools that allow the circumvention of 
technologies that control access to digital content (e.g., authentication measures).51 The 
second provision makes it illegal only to traffic in tools that allow the circumvention of 
usage controls; that is, technologies that control how digital content can be used.52 The 
personal circumvention of these usage controls is not controlled by the anti-
 
48 Microsoft Corp.’s new operating system Windows Vista plans to facilitate complete lock-down 
on protected content, ensuring each device is compliant with a given DRM standard to ensure no content 
escapes in a useable unencrypted digital format. See Marsh, supra note 45.  
49 Bechtold, supra note 6, at 331. The secret keys to the DVD security system CSS was hacked by a 
15-year-old Norwegian boy. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), (b).
51 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1), (2).
52 17 U.S.C. §1201(b)(1).
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circumvention provisions because traditional copyright law governs to what extent an 
individual may copy or use a copyrighted work.  
 U.S. courts have typically applied the letter of the law to anti-circumvention 
cases.53 However, some court decisions have refused to grant relief when the anti-
circumvention provisions are used to control access to down-stream markets and not 
actually copyrightable works.54 
3. DRM Usage Contracts 
 
DRM also protects the digital content by requiring consumers to enter into a contractual 
agreement, often called an “End-User License Agreement” (EULA), when they use 
DRM-enabled hardware, software, or content.  EULAs are used to establish privity of 
contract with the copyright holder and the end-user.55 They are typically in the form of 
“shrink-wrap” or “click-wrap” licenses.56 The consumer must agree to the license and 
permit the DRM system to regulate her conduct accordingly; there is generally no 
possibility for bargaining.57 
53 See Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
54 See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 31, 2004).
55 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 341. Establishing privity gets around the problem in Bobbs-Merrill 
where the U.S. Supreme Court established the first sale doctrine when there is no privity of contract 
between the copyright holder and the consumer. See Bobbs-Merrill, supra note 3.  
56 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 342-343.  
57 Thornburg, supra note 48, at 175. 
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EULAs serve two purposes. First, they give the copyright holder substantially 
more control over the use of the work by restricting the scope that the consumer can use 
the digital content under traditional copyright law.58 Second, EULAs help ensure that the 
DRM system remains secure. Many require that the user consent to automatic updates to 
ensure its client software be the most current.59 Other provisions require that the 
consumer understands her use could be immediately terminated upon detection of 
illegitimate use. Furthermore, EULAs will typically require that the user not engage in 
reverse-engineering activities for any purpose.60 These provisions aid in ensuring that the 
DRM system remains robust.  
EULAs are generally enforceable in both the United States and Europe. U.S. 
courts initially greeted EULAs with skepticism,61 but the trend recently has been strongly 
in favor of enforcement.62 This is not to say that all EULAs are enforceable, but most 
companies have been successful in using EULAs to support their DRM system.63 
58 See id.  
59 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 340.  
60 See id.; Thornburg, supra note 48, at 174-176. 
61 See Step-Saver Data Systems, supra note 25; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1248-1260 (1995). 
62 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1450-1453 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Davidson & Associates, supra note 27, 1176-1178; I. Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout 
Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338-339 (D. Mass. 2002); Steven J. Caspi, et. al. v. The 
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groff v. America Online, Inc., 
1998 WL 308001 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1998). The EU has also confirmed the enforceability of these licenses by 
Article 9(1) of the European E-Commerce Directive. See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 344.  
63 See id. at 344. Some EULAs have been struck down by U.S. courts in recent years. See Klocek v. 
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Kan. Dist. 2000) (stating that silence is insufficient for acceptance of 
a contract to which terms were added); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., F. Supp. 2d 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (where the court found there must be mutual consent, and merely providing a link to the 
EULA was insufficient; the EULA must be presented before the user can download). 
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4. Consumer Technology Licenses 
 
To incorporate the use of hardware in DRM systems, content holders must ensure that 
their DRM specifications are built into all of the consumer electronics devices that read 
their content. DRM protection would be flawed if a commercially-available device 
provided a loophole to permit digital copies.64 Naturally, manufacturers of consumer 
technology devices must produce products that can use available content. If the available 
content is encrypted using a patented DRM mechanism, the manufacturers must license 
that technology to make commercially-viable products. These licenses are not flexible. 
The manufacturer must agree to all the specifications made by the content holders, 
regardless whether or not those specifications relate to piracy protection.65 Content 
holders use this licensing scheme to protect their content while providing consumers the 
means to play their content.  
 
II. THE DIGITAL CONTENT MARKETPLACE AND THE CONSUMER 
 
The use of DRM systems in the digital content marketplace places several burdens on 
consumers. While we expect certain burdens on consumers in various situations, many of 
 
64 An analog hole currently exists today in most DRM systems. However, analog holes are less 
worrisome because of the attrition of quality inherent in analog copies.  
65 For example, DVD players cannot skip through segments of content that is specifically marked not to be 
skipped by any particular DVD. This enables the content holder to force the consumer to view preamble 
warnings, coming attractions, or credits. Also, DVD players must incorporate a regional coding system so 
that a DVD player will only play content for the region it was licensed to play. This allows the content 
holders to control the sale of DVDs to different markets without having to worry about gray-market goods.  
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these burdens in the digital content marketplace fall in areas that run afoul of legitimate 
consumer expectations. 
 This section will analyze how the current digital content market burdens the 
consumer.  It will address (1) EULAS; (2) consumer expectations of copyright 
limitations; (3) privacy; and (4) competition issues.   
 
A. Usage Contracts and Market Policy 
 
The use of shrink-wrap or click-wrap contract forms to impose a EULA is ubiquitous in 
the marketplace for digital works. Use of a digital work becomes conditional upon the 
consumer clicking the “I Accept” button and thereby agreeing to the terms presented on a 
scrollable window on the computer screen. The EULA contains pertinent information to 
the transaction. The majority of these EULAs term the transaction between the digital 
content holder and the consumer as a “license” to use the content, revocable by the 
content holder in certain circumstances. It attempts to define the scope of the consumer’s 
right to use the content, and often reserves the right to enforce these usage rules through 
DRM-enabled software.66 Many provisions like these have become widely accepted 
 
66 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 339.  
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while others are possibly unconscionable.67 This paper will focus on the burdens posed 
by a EULA with otherwise conscionable terms.68 
EULAs unfairly burden the consumer because consumers are ill-suited to 
comprehend the scope of such agreements. Do consumers ever actually read these license 
agreements? The answer is usually no.69 But even if the EULA is read, did the consumer 
understand it? Again, the answer is probably no.  
EULAs are often ignored because they are long, complicated and replete with 
technical terms, making for a demanding read.70 User frustration is likely amplified in a 
computerized environment. The appeal of making purchases on the Internet or using 
computer software is its inherent efficiency. Digital content today can be made available 
in seconds. It is unreasonable to expect a consumer to bottle-neck the expediency of a 
transaction to read a lengthy contract when it can be circumvented with a mere click of “I 
Accept.” Furthermore, consumers are inclined to ignore these contracts because many 
will feel that it would not be practical for the content holder to enforce the terms against 
them or because they assume it will not affect their use.71 Also, the cost of the transaction 
 
67 See Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User’s Guide to EULAs, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, available at http://www.eff.org/wp/eula.php (providing examples of ridiculous terms such as 
agreeing not to criticize the product publicly, not to use other vendor’s products to remove bundled 
spyware, to implicitly accept any future changes the content holder might make to the EULA without 
notice, and revoke any implied warranty and liability to any damage caused by the software). 
68 Unconscionable terms would have good chance of being thrown out in court. Alternatively, an 
analysis of why otherwise conscionable terms in a EULA is inappropriate makes a stronger argument for a 
change in the marketplace.  
69 See “It Pays to Read License Agreements”, available at 
http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (where to prove a point, a software company provided a 
clause that offered monetary consideration to anyone who could show that they read a specific clause; 
thousands of people downloaded the software before someone meekly wrote in to receive $1,000).  
70 See Gibbons, supra note 1, 1001.  
71 See Newitz, supra note 69. 
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plays a role in whether the consumer will feel it worthwhile to subject herself to reading 
the terms. Many digital content transactions involve a relatively small amount of money. 
Consider Apple’s iTunes, where the client application software is free, but the purchase 
of a song is $0.99.72 A consumer cannot be reasonably expected to read the lengthy 
iTunes EULA agreement when she only anticipates making a few dollars in purchases. 
However, when she has amassed a 200-song library, those terms become significantly 
important.  
 Consumer misunderstanding of EULA agreements is not limited to the confusing 
legal jargon found in many contracts.73 Consumers are often faced with complicated, 
ever-changing usage rules.74 In iTunes, the user is prevented from burning a specific 
music playlist over a specified number of times.75 By itself that might be reasonable, but 
what is left unanswered is to what degree the playlist needs to be altered until it can again 
be burned to CD.76 This kind of information might be critical because iTunes’s usage 
rules could be strict enough to severely impact consumer purchase choices. How does 
iTunes go about describing its function for determining adequate playlist difference? 
 
72 See “Why 99 cents per song”, available at 
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/01/why_99_cents_pe.html 
73 See James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L.J. 1719, 1728 (2005). 
74 Consider Microsoft’s new Zune music player, created to rival Apple’s iPod. It has a function 
coined “squirting,” whereby a Zune player can send a song to another Zune player within range. Microsoft 
had to compromise with the major record labels to only allow the “squirted” song to be deleted after three 
plays or three days, whichever first. See Steven Levy, Tune Into Zune?, Newsweek, Nov. 11, 2006, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15669798/site/newsweek/ (Jan. 10, 2007). 
75 See Features Last in iTunes Upgrades, available at 
http://www.george.hotelling.net/90percent/digital_music/features_lost_in_itunes_upgrades.php. 
76 Grimmelmann, supra note 75, at 1754. 
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Such a function might involve complicated computations, something beyond the purview 
of average consumer understanding.  
Even if we favor a policy reflecting a kind of caveat emptor for EULA contracts, 
there is still reason to sympathize with the consumer. At least one commentator has 
suggested that many companies purposely arrange EULAs in such a manner so as to 
ensure consumer vexation.77 The goal in such cases is to provide the consumer with as 
much incentive as possible to click the “I Agree” button and bypass the EULA. The 
current enforceability of EULAs enable businesses to benefit from such practices.  
The acceptance of EULAs as currently presented is inconsistent with a market 
policy that seeks mutual acceptance in contracting. Most often these contracts are not 
read or adequately understood by buyers. That does not mean that standard form 
contracts are unreasonable. The astounding amount of end-users simply would not permit 
a content holder to negotiate on a case-by-case basis. But the digital content market in its 
current form is not transparent to the consumer. While it may be convenient for the 
content holders to place the burden on the consumer, the reality of the situation is that the 
consumer is most likely to be unaware of the terms and restrictions of the content that she 
is purchasing.    
 
B. DRM and Consumer Expectations of Copyright Limitations 
 
77 Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1001. 
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 DRM systems have, without a doubt, imposed tighter restrictions on content use than the 
Copyright Act itself.78 This privatization of copyright has sparked vigorous debate over 
the balance between authors’ rights and public rights. Those copyright issues we address 
here – time shifting/space shifting, first sale doctrine, and the §117 computer program 
exceptions – are also qualitatively different from many other copyright defenses because 
they represent efficiency exceptions that the courts or Congress have carved out for 
consumers.79 
1. DRM with Time Shifting and Space Shifting 
 
Time shifting and space shifting represent two consumer fair use defenses that 
DRM will probably gain greater influence over. The budding use of trusted computing 
and similar technologies will help ensure that digital content remains under the purview 
of the content holders’ control.80 These technologies ensure that a “trusted” device will 
only interact with other “trusted” devices. Thus, a trusted device can be used to make 
certain that digital content is only handled by hardware that respects how the content 
 
78 See Bechtold, supra note 6.  
79 Concepts such as fair use parody and fair use commentary are beyond the scope of this article as 
they do not directly affect the consumer. Fair use parody involves the copying of a work so as to satirize the 
work. Fair use commentary permits one to use a work to comment on it, such as in a news program. Both 
forms are protected by fair use because often the content holder would be adverse to permitting such uses 
of the work. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
80 See Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk, EFF, available at 
http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/trusted_computing/20031001_tc.php.  
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holders want their content used. Content holders can impose such computing devices on 
consumers through DRM consumer device manufacturing licenses.81 
However, the situation is not so dire so as to think DRM will spell the end of time 
shifting and space shifting. There is huge consumer demand for devices that facilitate this 
kind of use. It is irrational to assume the digital content market would be unable to find 
an agreeable solution in the face of such high demand. But the way in which these 
devices are used may change. For example, devices like DVRs that record TV shows for 
time shifting purposes have irked content holders because they allow viewers to skip 
commercials, reducing the value of advertising.  DRM technology could prevent the 
viewer from skipping advertising or, concurrently, provide a service whereby the 
consumer pays a premium for the ability to fast forward commercials. Space shifting 
devices similarly have a high consumer demand where a market solution can be reached. 
We are already seeing enormous success with devices like Apple’s iPod, which has 
balanced consumer usability with protection for content holders through its DRM system 
FairPlay.82 High consumer demand can promote solutions where both the interests of 
consumers and content holders are accounted for.   
 
2. DRM with the First Sale Doctrine and the Computer Program Exceptions 
 
81 See infra Part I.B.4. 
82 See iTunes Store: Terms of Service, available at 
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html (Jan. 10, 2007). 
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 The first sale doctrine and the § 117 computer program exceptions exist as defenses 
when one is the “owner” of a tangible copy.83 The rampant use of EULAs in the digital 
content marketplace raises questions whether these consumer-licensees are entitled to the 
rights of an “owner.”84 The answer should be a cut-and-dry “no”: it was recommended to 
Congress to adopt the term “possessor” to avoid this dilemma, but Congress instead 
chose to use the term “owner.”85 This would suggest that Congress intended for the 
courts to treat owners and licensees differently. 
But in practice the answer has not been so clear because in the consumer’s mind 
these transactions still resemble a purchase for ownership. Ownership is implied by the 
frequent use of life-time licensing terms.86 As previously mentioned, the use of shrink-
wrap agreements to convey these licenses has displeased some courts and many 
commentators.  These licenses are so often skipped over or misunderstood that it is clear 
consumers place little gravity on the contract. It is no wonder that some courts have been 
reluctant to deny licensees ownership rights in this respect.87 
DRM systems cripple the first sale doctrine and § 117’s archival copy exception 
as they apply to consumers. DRM systems can regulate in these respects with or without 
the use of EULAs: the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions provide the requisite 
reinforcement to DRM measures that prevent archival copying or software tampering. 
 
83 See 17 U.S.C. 109, 117.
84 See infra Part I. B.3 
85 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, note 11 (5th Cir. 1988).
86 See Krause, supra note 31, at 123-24. 
87 See Vault, supra note 84, at; Step-Server Data Sys. V. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (E.D. Penn.1991).
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DRM can also keep track of digital content to prevent a second sale. For example, 
Microsoft introduced “product activation” in its Service Pack 2 to Windows XP. By 
requiring users to activate their software with Microsoft servers, Microsoft is effectively 
able to tie each copy of Windows XP to work with only one computer. Windows XP 
makes a unique identification number of the computer it is installed on by compiling the 
computer’s hardware specifications, and that copy of Windows is only usable on the 
computer with that unique identification number.88 In order to make a second sale of the 
copy of Windows XP, it may not be enough for a consumer to uninstall it from her 
computer. She may have to sell the entire computer as well, and even that might not be 
permitted.89 iTunes also hinders second sales by tying each song purchased from its 
online store to a user account which allows activation on up to five computers. 
Transferring individual songs to others is not included in the usage rules. 90 
Allowing second sales and archival copies may not be resolved by the market 
because the content holders lack the incentive to permit them. Enabling a DRM system to 
permit second sales would only be profitable if the consumer appeal of being able to 
make second sales increases revenue by more than the content holders would lose 
through the second sales themselves. The ability to resell digital content probably ranks 
well-below other consumer incentives to purchase.91 Furthermore, current sales may be 
 
88 See Jennifer Granick, “Do Antipiracy Measures Rob Consumers?,” available at 
http://news.com.com/2009-1001-251044.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 10, 2007). 
89 Because Microsoft has tied the copy of Windows to the seller’s computer, the buyer would be 
unable to activate the software on the buyer’s computer.  
90 See iTunes Store: Terms of Service, supra note 82. 
91 See “New Report From the NPD Group Provides Insight Into What Drives Consumers to 
Purchase PC and Video Games”, available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_061026.html. 
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unaffected by any such demand because consumers may believe that they are entitled to a 
second sale having not read the EULA.  Likewise, allowing archival copies for systems 
with product activation could mean the content holder loses sales for those who must 
purchase the product again in the case the consumer has lost the original copy. For digital 
content without product activation, allowing archival copies will facilitate illegal 
copying. Understandably, content holders would see it as a pointless service to allow. 
 Predicting the existence of these copyright exceptions in a DRM system requires 
analyzing whether the content holder benefits from the exceptions’ efficiencies. Content 
holders probably stand to benefit from time and space shifting because of the consumer 
demand associated with it. The first sale doctrine and the archival copy computer 
exception do not share a like consumer demand and will probably not be widely 
available.   
 
C. DRM and Privacy Concerns 
 
DRM systems impact consumer privacy concerns because these systems have enormous 
potential for data collection and distribution.92 Three questions must be asked of any 
DRM monitoring systems.  
 Who has access to the collected information? Controlling the flow of personal 
information is central to privacy. Consumers have a valid interest in whether the 
information is contained internally by the content holder or being sold to unknown third 
parties. Informing consumers about data access procedures lets the consumer know who 
 
92 See Julie Cohen, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management: DRM and Privacy, 18 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 575 (2003).
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to hold responsible if their information is made available. This information is easy for the 
content holder to provide to the consumer.93 
What is the data being used for? This is important in the consumer’s calculation 
concerning how much, if any, personal information she is prepared to share.94 A
consumer will be less inclined to offer information if it is used for marketing purposes as 
opposed to product research. Data can also be used for so called “self-help” purposes.95 
Self-help techniques detect unauthorized use and disable access to a work without the 
need to use the legal system.96 Self-help measures can be self-contained – meaning that 
unauthorized access is detected solely by the monitoring software – or the monitoring 
system can be supplemented with external controls (e.g., an outside server maintained by 
the content holder) that determine when there is a violation and how to penalize it.97 
What is the nature of the collected data? This is important because it determines 
the potential scope for which the data can be used. For example, anonymous information 
gives the data collector many less uses than does personalized information. Even when 
the data collector is a trusted entity, the nature of the data is crucial to maintain privacy. 
 
93 The European Community has been successful in proscribing regulations requiring data collectors 
to provide how their information is shared. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
on the free movement of such data.  
94 See e.g., Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, FTC, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
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Collected data is subject to disclosure through security breaches or compelled production 
(i.e., subpoenas).98 
DRM systems raise many of the same privacy concerns as other data collectors.99 
But DRM does differ significantly in the implementation of self-help mechanisms. If a 
user wants to use digital content protected by DRM self-help measures, she cannot opt-
out of data collection since doing so frustrates content protection. Furthermore, many 
self-help mechanisms require particularized data about an individual and/or a 
computer.100 The consumer should be made aware that identifying information is being 
mined. If this is only communicated in the EULA, as previously discussed, we can 
assume that the consumer is often oblivious.  
 
D. Competition Issues 
 
DRM is capable of certain market controls that can affect competition. Competition is 
crucial to consumer welfare in many instances.101 DRM systems restrain access to the 
content within, so competition is affected when access to that content is crucial for 
competitors to make opposing products. This is most relevant in the context of software. 
 
98 Id. at 585. 
99 Data collectors such as websites also subject the consumer to a terms of service agreement to 
authorize data collection. 
100 This is more likely in scenarios where the DRM must keep track of the digital content, such as 
when content is available on a user’s hard drive. 
101 See Timothy J. Muris, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/021031fordham.pdf. 
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Also, the broad DRM licensing schemes imposed upon consumer device manufacturers 
can also harm competition. This section will examine both these issues.  
 
1. Reverse Engineering 
 
Reverse engineering is the seminal tool used to access functional content and allow a 
competitor to enter a market. The pre-DMCA/pre-DRM copyright version of this issue is 
the reverse engineering of a computer platform. This facilitates access to the computer 
platform so as to create working software or to create a transformative competitor of the 
platform itself.102 Reverse engineering inherently involves unauthorized copying of 
underlying programs, which courts have termed “intermediate copying,” to find the 
functional aspects of the computer platform.103 Courts have characterized intermediate 
copying as fair use because the goal sought, the functional aspects, is unprotected by 
copyright. Not permitting intermediate copying would be a de facto protection of the 
functional aspects of the program, something left to patent law.  
With the passing of the DMCA, many content holders thought they had new tools 
to combat reverse engineering. DRM technology can greatly hinder reverse engineering 
efforts by making such efforts even more time-consuming, but more burdensome still is 
the possible legal repercussions for circumventing the DRM technology.104 However, 
some courts have continued the spirit of the pre-DMCA reverse engineering cases. In 
 
102 See, generally, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony 
Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
103 See id at 602-603. 
104 See 17 U.S.C. 1201(a). 
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Chamberlain v. Skylink,105 the Federal Circuit rejected the Chamberlain’s claim that 
Skylink’s garage-door transmitting device infringed the DMCA by being operational with 
the Chamberlain’s automatic garage door. Chamberlain’s garage door had been 
engineered with a “rolling code” that changed the code for the garage door on each use. 
This helped prevent potential intruders from intercepting the garage door code when used 
by the consumer.106 Skylink had reverse engineered this system to create its own garage 
door remote, and by doing so Chamberlain claimed that it had violated the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions. The court made some insightful rulings into interpreting the 
DMCA, but most important for our purposes the court stated that the anti-circumventing 
provisions “did not create a new property right for copyright owners.”107 Thus content 
holders could not rely on the DMCA to enforce private protection measures for property 
rights not granted by the Copyright Act.108 This reasoning is supportive of permitting new 
entrants into a technology market platform.  
However, software protected by DRM is supplemented by a EULA which will 
typically require a repudiation of any right to reverse engineer. In Davidson,109 the court 
upheld a EULA and held that defendants had agreed to give up any ambitions of reverse 
 
105 Supra note 54. 
106 Id. at 1183-84. 
107 Id.  
108 See also Lexmark,  supra note 54. In Lexmark, plaintiff Lexmark used a mechanism in its printers 
that would perform a “handshake” with Lexmark’s toner cartridges to ensure that only Lexmark toner 
cartridges were being used. Defendant Static Control Components (SCC) developed toner cartridges that 
mimicked the handshake functions of the Lexmark toner cartridges and used, verbatim, a small sequence of 
copyrighted code. The court found that Lexmark’s code was not copyrightable, and that Lexmark’s 
“handshake” sequence did not qualify for § 1201 anti-circumvention protection. The “handshake” was not 
an adequate security device to qualify under § 1201.  
109 Supra, note 26. 
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engineering the plaintiff’s game server. This ruling could chill competition because it 
suggests that no one would be permitted to reverse engineer any technology containing a 
EULA with an anti-reverse engineering clause. The content holder is unlikely to ever be 
interested in permitting reverse engineering in any available works because it would 
enable competition.  
In sum, the language of the DMCA is not so draconian that courts apply a per se 
rule to circumvention of DRM technology. But the use of contract law to forbid reverse 
engineering is likely to encourage a competitive environment.  
 
2. DRM Licensing Schemes 
 
Many DRM systems incorporate the use of technology that is licensed to consumer 
device manufacturers. These licenses enable the manufacturers to create DRM-
compatible devices under the auspices of specifications made or suggested by content-
holding industry.110 Device manufacturers are forced to enter into these agreements if 
they want content to be available for their product.111 The technology is licensed by the 
developers of the protection technology or by a designated licensing authority that 
administers the licenses on behalf of a content industry.112 
These licenses typically require a licensee for one DRM technology component to 
incorporate other DRM components. For example, a device manufacturer that wants to 
 
110 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 367. 
111 Id. 
112 Id.  
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enable its product to use CSS113 to play DVDs must also agree to use regional code 
management technology, only transmit analog video in a copy protected format, and 
disable digital transmissions to devices without copy protection technologies.114 Antitrust 
claims relating to tying,115 however, are probably premature or already failing. First, it is 
questionable whether the licenses curb horizontal competition among the manufacturers 
in a significant way.116 Manufacturers are restrained in how they can compete in 
accessing protected content and how they can channel that content, but they are still free 
to compete over price, design, size, reliability, warranty, or other means.117 Second, 
technology licenses have many antitrust exceptions that apply when efficiencies can be 
 
113 CSS stands for Content Scramble System. It provides a mechanism for encrypting/decrypting 
video on DVDs. 
114 See Bechtold, supra note 6, at 348. Reflecting upon the development of the DVD player device 
since the introduction of its DRM protection CSS in 1996 suggests that it has remained relatively 
unchanged. This is a large contrast with other non-DRM devices, such as the personal computer. 
115 Tying is the practice of making the sale of one product conditional upon the purchase of a 
different product. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992); 
Northern Pacific Ry v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 
392 (1947) (ruling that it is illegal under the Sherman Act to tie a product that the seller has a legal 
monopoly with a product that the seller has no legal monopoly). 
116 Competition analysis for licensor-licensee agreements is conducted from a horizontal perspective.  
See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Antitrust Guidelines), 4 Trade Reg. 
Rep. P 13132, § 4.1.1 (Apr. 4, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. It 
is also possible to critique the horizontal effects between the content holders (licensors). However, this may 
fail since the use of DRM provides a new competitive attribute to the market; content providers can now 
compete over whether their product is protected by DRM or not.  
117 The most interesting advance in DVD player technology was probably the introduction of 
filtering technology, created by a company called ClearPlay and made available on certain RCA players. 
ClearPlay’s movie critics went through hundreds of movies and noted scenes that might be deemed 
inappropriate. That information is embedded on the player’s firmware, and the player automatically filters 
out any portions of a movie that match its database. The Motion Picture Association of America filed suit 
against ClearPlay in 2004 for copyright and trademark infringement, but the case was considered moot 
after Congress passed the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, which explicitly protected such 
filtering technology. See Ted Bridis, Congress OKs bill to strip DVD Movie Smut, Associated Press, April 
20, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-04-20-dvd-censor-bill-
passes_x.htm?csp=34 (November 30, 2006).  
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found.118 The Federal Trade Commission approaches technology licensing with a 
different understanding, recognizing that technology licensing generates efficiencies that 
may not be present in the licensing schemes of other industries.119 
The current antitrust framework may not provide much in the way of recourse for 
technology licensing and tying. Historically, many technological innovations have 
involved the bundling of different technologies and the courts have deferred to innovators 
concerning the design of their product.120 
E. Concluding Thoughts on the Digital Content Marketplace and the Consumer 
 
The reality of the situation is that the content holders tend to have an unfair advantage 
over consumers and are not necessarily accountable for the frustrations imposed by their 
DRM systems. When a consumer activity is blocked or otherwise hindered, it is often 
unclear who is responsible.121 Even if a consumer finds the DRM incorporated with 
content to be unacceptable, returning the content is often troublesome because some 
packaging seal has been breached, the license agreements states otherwise, or the 
 
118 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 115, at § 5.3. 
119 Id.  
120 See e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 346 U.S.App.D.C. 330 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
that the tying of an Internet browser with an operating system was not an unlawful tie per se and that such 
design decisions could result in efficiencies for consumers); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 
698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that IBM’s design changes which made the plaintiff’s devices 
incompatible were not unlawful); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the bundling of an operating system with an computer did not constitute unlawful 
tying) Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that the 
combining of disk and head/disk assembly was not unlawful per se), aff’d per curiam sub. nom. Memorex 
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).  
121 See Grimmelmann, supra note 73, at 1754. 
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consumer discovered the DRM restraint too late. Furthermore, the average consumer is 
going to be ignorant of the effect of anti-reverse engineering clauses, so by and large the 
consumer would be unlikely to consider it in her cost-analysis of the purchase even if the 
EULA was read.  
 
III. REFINEMENTS TO THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
I propose addressing the digital content market deficiencies in two general ways: digital 
content transactions should be more transparent and the doctrine of copyright misuse 
should emerge to protect reverse engineering. 
 
A. Making the Market More Transparent 
 
Digital content holders do not usually communicate the nature of the transaction in such 
a way as to make it transparent that the consumer will be restricted by a DRM system. 
While the use of standard form contracts is probably essential when digital content is 
distributed via mass market mechanisms, a transparent transaction can help make up for 
the loss of consumer bargaining power that these contracts present. However, the nature 
of computerized transactions can make complete transparency difficult to achieve.122 A 
prudent policy should take this into account to encourage consumer awareness of DRM 
restrictions. 
 
122 See infra Part II.A. 
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I propose that license agreements should walk, talk and act like license 
agreements. We know that digital content is almost universally licensed. Yet the 
operative word leading up to a transaction always suggests a sale of ownership. Apple’s 
iTunes Music Store provides a button titled “Buy Now” next to each song. Software, in 
boxed form or available for download over the Internet, often entices the consumer to 
“buy” or “purchase.”123 Consumers will not equate “buy” with “buy a license 
agreement.” The words “buy,” “purchase,” or “place order” are understood to confer a 
transfer of ownership in nearly every other context the consumer sees it.124 
The overwhelming use of these operative words in conjunction with end-user 
licensing may be part of the reason that EULAs are so often overlooked. Were content 
holders required to entice buyers with a phrase like “License Now,” the consumer may be 
better prepared and more willing to confront the EULA agreement responsibly.  
 Perhaps the greatest benefit lies in creating a market for digital goods to be sold 
for ownership. Consumers may be drawn to content holders that offer ownership in the 
place of licensing, allowing them to avoid the frustrations of DRM. Businesses are 
already considering these distribution models after considering the cost-effectiveness of 
using DRM.125 Making license sales present themselves as actual licenses allows 
 
123 Purchases of digital content made in the “physical world” are little different from any other kind 
of purchase, except that a software box may have a small inscription stating that the purchase is subject to a 
license that is inside the box. See, e.g., ProCD, supra note 63, at 1450. Purchases for software in online 
stores make no mention of a license agreement, using instead a shopping cart model. At Amazon.com, 
consumers add items to a virtual shopping cart. When finished shopping, the consumer clicks the “Proceed 
to Checkout” button, and, after filling in credit card information, clicks a button titled “Place your Order.” 
124 As a non-exhaustive list, leases for cars, living spaces, and furniture do ask the consumer to 
“buy.”  
125 Sony BMG and Yahoo! are experimenting with DRM-free music. See US Yahoo Offer Copy-
Free Music, BBC News, July 21, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5203146.stm 
(Jan 11, 2007). Steve Jobs of Apple has also stated his desire to move iTunes music to a less constrained 
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consumers to better distinguish the two, giving a boost to those companies selling DRM-
free content.  
Alternatively, the content holder would also be able to sell the content for 
ownership but still enable DRM. The sale of DVDs is an existing example of this, usually 
including a reservation of the content holder’s rights.126 This gets tricky when DRM-
protected content is downloaded directly onto a personal computer. The consumer’s 
ability to make a second sale becomes stunted.127 The only way to sell the item may be to 
sell it along with the hard drive or circumvent the DRM and transfer it afterward.128 This 
is not a favorable model, so ownership of DRM protected content may need a different 
approach. 
 
B. Applying Copyright Misuse 
 
DRM hinders the contribution reverse engineering gives to the technology marketplace. 
The Copyright Act permits technological circumventions for purposes of reverse 
engineering in § 1201(f). However, the license agreements in DRM systems typically 
 
DRM-environment. See David DeJean, “Steve Jobs On DRM-Free Media: Right Idea, Whatever His 
Reasons,” available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2007/02/steve_jobs_on_d.html. 
126 General terms of these reservations include where the product is permitted to be sold and that it be 
used for private use only. “All other rights reserved.” 
127 It would be unlawful for a content holder to restrict a consumer’s second sale right without the 
use of a license agreement. See 17 U.S.C. 109.
128 Note that the consumer would be able to use circumvention tools because § 1201 does not apply 
to a consumer circumventing her own copy.  
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forbid this, and courts have upheld these provisions.129 The fate of reverse engineering 
may be dependant on copyright misuse reaching full fruition.  
 The doctrine of copyright misuse has not been universally accepted. The United 
States Supreme Court has nominally recognized it,130 and only a handful of lower court 
decisions exist that address it. Copyright misuse is an equitable doctrine that prevents a 
content holder from succeeding on a claim while she has “unclean hands.” Copyright 
misuse combines policy-based and market-based principles to coordinate copyright, 
patent, and antitrust law.131 
There are some persuasive federal appeals cases that set the foundations for 
copyright misuse. In Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,132 Lasercomb had licensed out its 
software that allowed the design and direction of manufacturing systems. The standard 
license agreement provided that the licensee could not create or sell software of this 
type.133 A particular licensee copied the program for its own internal use and began 
selling a program that was nearly identical to Lasercomb’s. The Fourth Circuit found that 
“Lasercomb’s anticompetitive clauses in its standard licensing agreement constitute 
misuse of copyright.”134 The Court clarified by stating there would be a finding of 
copyright misuse when a copyright holder uses a copyright “to control competition in an 
 
129 See Davidson and Associates, supra note 23. 
130 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942), at 494. 
131 See Frischmann & Moyan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified 
Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 865 (2000), 872-877.  
132 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
133 Id. at 973.
134 Id. at 979.
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area outside the copyright… regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust 
violation.”135 In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs. Inc.,136 the Fifth Circuit found copyright 
misuse where a licensor (DSC) of copyrighted operating system software for switching 
equipment required that its licensees only use the software in “conjunction with DSC-
manufactured equipment.”137 The defendant, DGI Technologies, Inc., (DGI) made a card 
that was interoperable with the plaintiff’s operating system and was sued for copyright 
infringement.138 A finding of copyright misuse was found with DSC was using its 
copyrighted operating system to gain control over switch components which were neither 
copyrighted nor patented.139 Copyright misuse is typically applied when copyright license 
agreements tie in a different product. The key notion here is that while antitrust principles 
are applicable, the copyright holder’s activity need not be unlawful.140 It only need be 
improper.  
 Copyright misuse is an ideal judicial tool to ensure that copyright is not used to 
protect functional innovations. DRM reverse engineering issues are nearly identical to 
those raised in the above copyright misuse cases. In both situations, a content holder uses 
a license agreement as an instrument to protect the functional elements of the copyrighted 
work. This exacerbates the internal conflict of granting copyright protections to software 
 
135 Id. 
136 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999). 
137 Id. at 777. 
138 DGI was also sued for trade secret violations, which the Fifth Circuit upheld. Id. 
139 Id. at 793. 
140 But see Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(where Judge Posner comments that copyright misuse should be analyzed under antitrust principles). 
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in the first place: using the copyright protections granted to software’s expressive 
elements to protect the software’s functional aspects.141 It is important for the judiciary to 
ensure that functionality and expression are not jointly protected under copyright law. 
However, copyright misuse is far from solidified. If one takes to giving greater 
weight to antitrust principles, a finding of misuse becomes more difficult because courts 
are less inclined to give content holders market power, a prerequisite for a finding of an 
antitrust violation.142 For this reason I would advocate a less-strict adherence to antitrust 





DRM systems enable content holders to create and maintain their own copyright 
regulations. As of today, DRM protections usually serve as an annoyance or frustration. 
Tomorrow it is possible that DRM will give content holders complete control over 
downstream consumption of their works. But this does not doom the consumer. We know 
that DRM burdens consumers in significant ways, but it is important to note that it also 
burdens content holders. Increased DRM protections will probably mean that the content 
holder must have greater infrastructure, more internal maintenance, and more technical 
support. And if the economic burdens on the content holder do not limit her use of DRM, 
there must surely be a limit to the extent of DRM-related hurdles that the consumer will 
 
141 See Grimmelmann, supra note 73, at 910-913.  
142 See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, tit. II, 20, 102 Stat. 4676 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C 271(d)(5)(1994)). 
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tolerate before interest in a product wanes. We will likely soon reach some kind of 
“DRM-threshold” for each kind of content medium.  
 The way to ensure that the DRM threshold is “fair” is to encourage competition 
between similar products with varying degrees of DRM protection. In places where high-
consumer demand exists, such as time shifting and space shifting, we already see 
compromises being made to accommodate both content holders and consumers. Where 
there is no straightforward consumer demand, it is prudent policy to ensure that the 
market remains competitive and that other consumer and social interests, such as reverse 
engineering, remain intact. 
